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THE ROCKY ROAD OF THE U.S.
ACCESSION TO THE MADRID
PROTOCOL: COULD THIS BE THE YEAR?

I.

INTRODUCTION

Trademark law serves to ensure a consumer that if she purchases
a package of "OREO®" cookies in California, that they will be
from the same source and have the same quality as the package of
"OREO®" cookies she purchases in Florida. The Lanham Act
serves to avoid consumer confusion by providing for a registration,
and enforcement mechanism for Trademarks for the entire
country. However, there is currently no similar mechanism that
operates on an international level. Each country has its own
trademark laws, containing mechanisms for enforcement, however,
these laws still wouldn't reassure a consumer in New Zealand that
the package of "OREG®" cookies they bought originates from the
same source as the ones purchased in the U.S. This situation,
however, might change in the near future due to the increase need
for international agreements in light of the increase in international
marketing and globalization.
The increase in global trade has heightened the importance of
registering and protecting trademarks around the world.2 There is
currently an international system whereby trademarks can be
registered internationally through one simple procedure.3 The
Madrid System for the international registration of trademarks
allows a company to register its trademark in several countries
4
with one application.
1Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C.S. § 1051 (1946).
2 Seminar on the Madrid System of International Registration of Marks, at

www.wipo.int/madrid/en/meetings/2001/seminar
visited Dec. 3, 2001).

10/generalinfo.htm (last

3id.

4id.

525
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However, the United States is not a member of either of the
Madrid System treaties. 5 Consequently, under existing law, all
U.S. businesses must register their marks in each country in which
protection is sought.6 This is a costly process that causes many
companies to forego registering in certain countries. As a result,
U.S. companies face the threat of having their trademarks pirated
by a company or individual. This poses two possible problems: 1)
pirates may ask for payments before turning over the trademarks to
the American company, 2) consumers cannot be sure that they get
the product they expect when purchasing something with a
trademark. Further, because the U.S. has not joined the Madrid
System, smaller nations have a disincentive to join either of the
Madrid Systems, given the dominance of U.S. business in world
trade.
This note discusses the Madrid Protocol and its development. It
focuses on the U.S. implementation of this Treaty by two pieces of
legislation, which are currently being debated in the U.S.
Congress, S. 407 and H.R. 741. The note also discusses the
reasons why this legislation has not passed the Congress despite
that similar legislation has been introduced in every Congress for
the last ten years, and despite the absence of political opposition to
the substance of these bills. The discussion also follows the
development of an international trademark dispute that is currently
on appeal at the WTO, and the effects this ruling will have on U.S.
accession to the Protocol.
II.

BACKGROUND

The Madrid System of international registration of marks
consists of two parallel but independent treaties: 7 the Madrid
Agreement Concerning the International Registration of Marks
5World Intellectual Property Organization, Madrid Protocol, General
Information, at http://www.wipo.int/madrid/en/index.html (last visited Dec. 3,
2001).
6id.
7id.
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(Madrid Agreement), which dates back to 1891, and the Protocol
Relating to the Madrid Agreement (Madrid Protocol), which came
into operation on April 1, 1996.8 The International Bureau of the
World Intellectual Property Organization
(WIPO) in Geneva,
9
Switzerland administers both treaties.
A.

The MadridAgreement

1. Background
In 1891, the Madrid Agreement established the first
international registration system for trademarks. 10 The Agreement
creates an "exclusive club"' 1 where nationals of member countries
are allowed to apply for and hold trademark registrations that
provide simultaneous protection in several countries. 12 Nationals
of member countries have the opportunity to file an international
application within their own national Trademark office and select
which member countries where they seek protection. 13 The
international application is then forwarded to the WIPO, which
issues an international registration, then publishes the mark and
forwards it to the member countries that were selected for
examination pursuant to national law. 14 If there is no opposition to
the mark, it is then deemed protected in all the countries selected.15
The philosophy of the Madrid Agreement is that the owner of a
8Id.
9Id.

10John Welch, MadridBound: The UnitedStates Approaches Ratification of the

MadridProtocol,INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY TODAY, December 2000, at 34.
"Barbara
1
Cookson, How the MadridProtocol Works, PLI Order No. GO-00NS,
654 PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, PATENTS, COPYRIGHTS, TRADEMARKS, AND
LITERARY PROPERTY COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 161, 169 (2000).
12id.
13Jeff M. Samuels, The MadridProtocoland TrademarkHarmonization,PLI
Order No. G4-3921, 387 PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE PATENTS, COPYRIGHTS,
TRADEMARKS, AND LITERARY PROPERTY COURSE HANDBOOK, 231,234 (1994).
14id.
15 Id.
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trademark registration in one member country can become the
owner of a corresponding international registration that would
potentially 16become effective in all of the countries of the
Agreement.
It was originally expected by the international business
community that the Madrid Agreement would be extremely
popular because of the benefits it provides to businesses by
facilitating a single place to register trademarks internationally,
while at the same time permitting countries sovereignty over
trademark law. 17 However, in 1991, 100 years later, only 38 states
had adopted the Agreement.18 Even more disappointing was that
many commercially significant countries, such as the United
States, Japan, Canada, and the United Kingdom, refused to join. 9
2. Problems
In the late 1960's the United States considered joining the
Agreement, but concluded it contained provisions disadvantageous
to United States trademark owners and unworkable under existing
five factors were singled out as being
law. 0 Specifically,
21
problematic.
a. RegistrationProcess
The Agreement requires a home registration in order to file an

16 CoOKSoN,

supra note 11, at 169.
17.rd.
18 World Intellectual Property Organization, Madrid Protocol, General
Information, at http://www.wipo.int/madrid/en/index.html.
19 Geoffrey C. Gaughan, The European TrademarkDilema, THE LEGAL
March 24, 1997, at 82.
MadridProtocolAct: Hearingson H.R. 1270 Before the Subcomm. on Courts
and IntellectualPropertyon the House Committee on Judiciary, 104th Cong.
67-68 (1995) (Statement of Philip G. Hampton, II, Assistant Commissioner for
Trademarks).
21 SAMUELS, supra note 13, at 234.
2INTELLIGENCER,
0
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international application. 22 This requirement disadvantages U.S.
trademark owners because the U.S. registration process is lengthier
than most other countries. Therefore, U.S. trademark holders run
the risk of a business in another country winning the race to
register the same mark.24
b. Refusal
The Agreement only gives each country 12 months to refuse an
application. 25 The U.S. has a lengthy examination process, which
requires more than 12 months to determine whether a trademark
application will be approved. 26 In order to meet the 12-month
obligation, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (herein after
referred to as USPTO) would have to give priority to the
Agreement applications.2 7 This would create a longer wait for
domestic applications, which would also cause serious
disadvantages for domestic applications.2 8
c. CentralAttack
The provision allows for a scheme known as a "central attack,"
which cancels an international registration if the home country
29
registration is successfully attacked during the first five years.
This would particularly disadvantage U.S. trademark holders
because there 30are more possible grounds for attack under U.S.
trademark law.

22Id. at 235.

3Id.

24id.

25 Id.
26 SAMUELS,

supranote 13, at 235.

27 id.
28 id.
291d.
30

Id. at 236.
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d. Language Barrier
The only official language of the Agreement is French. 3 1 This
would require the USPTO to translate every document submitted
under the Agreement from English to French, a process that could
prove to be time consuming and expensive.32
e. Fee schedule
33
The Agreement provides for a relatively low fee schedule.
The fee under the Agreement would be substantially lower than
applications for U.S. registrations, and since the federal
registration system is funded entirely through user fees, this would
U.S. trademark owners to subsidize the foreign
ultimately require
3
applications.

B.

The MadridProtocol

In an effort to address these perceived shortcomings and thereby
attract more countries to the Madrid System, the parties to the
1989. 35
Madrid Agreement signed the Madrid Protocol in June
The United States was an observer and advisor to these talks but
not a participant in the negotiations since only signatories could
amend the Madrid Agreement.36 The Protocol took effect in April
1996, and currently binds 53 countries, including countries that
part of the Agreement such as Japan and the United
were not 37
Kingdom.
Five major changes comprise the Protocol. First, the Protocol
does not require an actual home registration, but instead allows for
31 id.
32 id.
33 SAMuELs, supra note 13, at 236.
34 id.
35

WELCH,

supra note 10.

3 S. REP. No. 107-46, at4 (2001).
37 World Intellectual Property Organization, Madrid Protocol, General

Information, at http://www.wipo.int/madridlen/index.htnl (last visited Dec. 3,
2001).
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international registrations to be based on trademark applications in
their home country.38 This correction eliminates the disadvantage
to businesses whose home country registration process is lengthier.
Second, the Protocol now gives each country 18 months to
refuse an application. 39 This allows each country more time to
look over the application and determine if there are any problems
with the registration of the mark within their country. After 18
months, the country looses its right to reject the mark. a°
Next, the Protocol still allows for a "central attack," however it
has two mechanisms to remedy this situation.4 1 First, after the
initial five-year period, the international registration becomes
independent of the home registration. 42 Second, the Protocol
allows international registrations that have been cancelled in the
home country in the initial five year-year period to be
"transformed" into several individual national applications in the
countries in which the registrant requests registration.43 This
transformation would allow the centrally44 attacked registrant to
retain the benefit of the original filing date.
Fourth, the Protocol has two official languages, French and
English. a5 This would eliminate the need for the USPTO to
translate applications. In addition, English is a more practical
language to use because it has become the dominant language in
international business.
Finally, the Protocol gives members the option of charging an
individual fee, instead of requiring a lower priced fixed fee.46 This

3
1

Keith W. Medansky, UnitedStates May Join Ranks ofMadridProtocol

Multiple TrademarkFilingsfor InternatiaonalProtectionMay Soon be a Thing
of the Past,THE NATIONAL LAW JOURNAL, April 30, 2001, at C7.
39id.
40 id.
41
rd.
42 id.

43

Medansky at C7.
44Id.
45 id.

46id.
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allows members to set a fee to cover the cost of the national
examination process. 47 The fee, however, cannot be more than the
fee to file an individual application in that country.48
Thus, the Protocol has been rewritten to make it possible for
commercially significant countries such as the U.S. to join. 49 In
fact, many countries that were not part of the Agreement have
signed onto the Protocol, including, as previously mentioned, the
U.K., and Japan. 50 However, "the U.S. remains the highest profile
hold-out," and it's membership is seen by other signatory nations
as key to persuading the countries that have been reluctant to sign
the treaty.5 ' Members fear that without U.S. participation, the
Protocol may never achieve its52 purpose of providing a one-stop
'shop' for trademark applicants.
The International Trademark Association (hereinafter referred to
as INTA) has endorsed the Madrid Protocol as a simple, effective
and relatively inexpensive way of registering trademarks
internationally.53 INTA, which is an organization of trademark
owners, has given strong support for the Protocol and has heavily
lobbied Congress to pass the legislation implementing the
Protocol. 54 INTA has also assisted the U.S. in resolving domestic
and international disputes that have gotten in the way of
implementation.5 5 Nevertheless, despite the support the Protocol
has received, the U.S. has failed to join.
47

COOKSON, supra note 11, at 169.

48 Id.
49 SAMuELs, supra note 13, at 234.
50

World Intellectual Property Organization, Madrid Protocol, General
Information, at http://www.wipo.int/madrid/en/index.html (last visited Dec. 3,
2001).
5
1 William New, Key Lawmakers Move to Implement Trademark Treaty,
NATIONAL JOURNAL'S TECHNOLOGY DAILY PM EDITION, March 5, 2001.
52 S. REP. No. 107-46, at 4 (2001).
53 International Trademark Association, The Madrid System for the
International Registration of Marks, Position Papers and Reports, at
http://www.inta.org/downloads/tapmadridsys2000.pdf (last visited Dec. 3,
2001).
54
id.
55

id.
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C. Overview of PoliticalProblems
The Madrid Protocol implementing legislation faces no partyline opposition from either the Democrats or Republicans.
Further, the Congressional Budget (hereinafter referred to as CBO)
office has estimated that implementing the Protocol would have
"no significant effect on the federal budget." 56 The CBO estimates
that it would cost approximately $500,000 to help the USPTO
update their computer systems to better communicate with the
WIpO.57 Yet, despite all the support from the business and
Intellectual Property community, and lack of opposition in the
Congress, the numerous attempts of implementation by the U.S.
Congress since 1992 have failed.58
1.

Voting Rights Issue

The U.S. State Department's initial objection was to a voting
rights provision in the Protocol. 59 This provision gives the
European Community (EC) an additional vote on top of the votes
each EC member country gets. 60 Thus, each EC member would be
given a full vote, plus 1/15 of a vote. 61 Because the United States
did not participate in the negotiations that resulted in the Madrid
Protocol, they had no input into the question of how members
could vote. 62 The State Department expressed concern the EC
would use their extra vote against the U.S.6 3 The State Department
also opposed this voting structure because it contravened the
democratic concept of one vote per country and it feared that this
voting structure would establish a precedent that regional multi56 S.

407, 107th Cong. (2001), Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate, at

http://thomas.loc.gov.
5
7id.

" S. REP. No. 107-46, at 4 (2001).
59 id.

601d.
61
Id.
62

James N. Palik, Failureby U.S. to Join MadridProtocolProves Costly,

N.Y.L.J., June 23, 1997, at S4.
63 S REP. No. 107-46, at 4 (2001).
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national organizations could
acquire an extra vote in future
64
agreements.
international
The voting rights issue was resolved in February of 2000 when
the European Community agreed not to use its vote against the
United States, but rather to consult with the United States upon
casting its vote.65 As a result, in September 2000, then-President
Clinton sent a letter to the Senate urging U.S. accession to the
Protocol. 66 With the voting rights opposition resolved in the
U.S.'s favor and the administration urging its adoption, it was
optimistically expected that the United States could become a
member of the Madrid Protocol sometime in mid-to-late 2001.67
Legislation to implement the Protocol advanced through both
houses of Congress. 68 The House of Representatives had already
passed H.R. 769 in April of 1999.69 However, the Senate version,
S.671 and the approval of the Treaty were held up in the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee. 70 Consequently, the hopes of
adopting the Protocol by 2001 were killed.
This time, the reason for the bill's holdup an international
dispute over the trade name "Havana Club" for rum.71 The dispute
involved a lawsuit filed in the U.S. by Havana Club Holdings
(hereinafter referred to as HCH), which is a joint venture between
the French liquor giant, Pernod Ricard, and the government of
Cuba.72 HCH sought to enjoin U.S. rum manufacturer, Bacardi,
Ltd., (owner of Galleon, S.A.) from using the Havana Club
64 id.

65 Brenda

Sandburg, House Gives; The Nod to Key TrademarkBill, American
Lawyer Media, THE RECORDER, May 3, 2001, at 1.
66

S. REP. No. 107-46, at 4 (2001).
Trademark Association Press Release on Madrid Protocol, June,

67 International

2000, at http://www.inta.org/news/current.shtnl ("Barring any unforeseen

complications during this presidential election year, the United States could

become a member of the Madrid Protocol in mid-to-late 2001."( (last visited
Dec. 3, 2001).
61

S.REP. No. 107-46, at 4 (2001).

69 H.R. 769, 106th Cong. (1999).
70 id.

S. REP. No. 107-46, at 4 (2001).
Club Holding, S.A. v. Galleon, S.A., 961 F.Supp. 498 (S.D.N.Y.
1997).

71

72 Havana
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trademark.73 The Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee,
Senator Helms pulled the Protocol implementation bill and Treaty
from consideration because he was concerned that joining the
Protocol74 might give HCH an advantage in the trade name
dispute.
2.

The Cuban Rum Crisis

HCH, sells Havana Club rum in many countries throughout the
world, except for the United States, where an embargo against the
Cuban government currently prohibits its sale.75 Prior to 1960, the
Havana Club label was a registered trademark held by the
Arechabala family who exported Havana Club rum into the United
States. 6 In 1960, the Castro government seized and expropriated
all of the Arechabala family's assets including its rum
manufacturing facilities and trademark registrations. 7 7 In 1994,
the Cuban government assigned its U.S. registration for the
Havana Club trademark to HCH.75 HCH is the joint venture
between the Cuban government and the French liquor company,
in 1996, HCH renewed the registration for
Pemod Ricard. 79 Later,
80
years.
often
a term
Meanwhile, in 1995, Galleon S.A. began producing their own
line of "Havana Club" rum in the Bahamas and marketing this rum
in the United States. 81 Bacardi, a U.S. company, then purchased
Galleon and in addition, purchased the Arechabala family's rights
registration of Havana Club trademark, which had since
to the U.S.
82 lapsed.
73id.
74

id.

75
76

Havana Club Holding, S.A. v. Galleon, S.A., 203 F.3d 116 (2d. Cir. 2000).
Id. at 119.

77 -d.

78 id.
79Id.
80

Id. at 120.

Havana Club Holding, S.A. v. Galleon, S.A., 203 F.3d 116, 121 (2d. Cir.
2000).
82
81

Id at 120.
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"In December 1996, HCH sued Bacardi in Federal District Court
to enjoin Bacardi from using the Havana Club trademark, alleging
violations of sections 32 and 43(a) of the Lanham Act".83 In
August of 1997, the District Court held HCH had no rights to the
Havana Club trademark in the United States. 84 The Office of
Foreign Assets Control had revoked the Cuban government's
license to assign the Havana Club trademark to HCH. 85 "The
determination to revoke License No. C-18147 is made pursuant to
§515.805 of the Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. Part
515. " 86 This ruling was due in large part to the trade embargo that
the United States has imposed against Cuba since 1963.87
The Court then subsequently granted HCH's motion to amend
their Complaint to claim rights to the Havana club trade name
under sections 44(g) and 44(h) of the Lanham Act, and Chapter III
of the General Inter-American Convention (IAC) for Trade Mark
and Commercial
Protection, of which both Cuba and the U.S. are
88
signatories.
During the same time, the U.S. Congress passed §211 of the
Omnibus
Consolidated
and
Emergency
Supplemental
Appropriations Act on October 21, 1998.89 The law denies the
Cuban Government or Cuban nationals intellectual property rights
and access to U.S. courts to enforce these rights when the business
assets were confiscated without express consent from the original
owner or successor-in-interest. 90
Republican Senator Jesse
83
84

85
86

Havana Club Holding, S.A. v. Galleon, S.A., 961 F.Supp. 498 (1997).
id.
.1d.
Havana Club Holding, S.A. v. Galleon, S.A., 203 F.3d 116, 120 (2d. Cir.

2000), quoting OFAC's Notice of Revocation, revoking License No. C-18147
(HCH's
license) April 17, 1997.
87
Havana Club Holding, S.A. v. Galleon, S.A., 203 F.3d at 120.
88

Id. at 121.
Pub.L. No. 105-277 105th, §211 "Bars certain transactions with respect to
intellectual property in which the Cuban Government or a Cuban national has an
89

interest with respect to a mark or trade or commercial name that is the same as
or substantially similar to one that was used in connection with a business or
assets that were confiscated unless the original owner or successor-in-interest
has
90 expressly consented." (1998).
Id.
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Helms along with his colleague from Florida, Senator Connie
Mack, were instrumental in getting this legislation passed.91
The court then rejected the amended complaint stating that
because of the Cuban embargo, HCH was not able to sell its
product in the United States and therefore had no rights in the
trademark or trade name Havana Club. 92 In addition, the court
cited §211 as limiting the recognition of HCH's rights to Havana
Club because they were used in connection with property
confiscated by the government of Cuba.93 The court properly gave
effect to the statute because "it did not upset a right plaintiff had
under prior law." 94 HCH also lost its claim for false designation of
geographic origin under Lanham Act 15 U.S.C.S. §1125 because
the court held that they lacked standing, given the fact that they are
and thus could not
not allowed to compete in the U.S. market,
95
prove that they are likely to be harmed.
The Second Circuit United States Court of Appeals affirmed the
District Court's findings in Havana Club Holding, S.A. v. Galleon
S.A., Bacardi-MartiniUSA, Inc, in February of 2000.96 Later that
year, the97Supreme Court denied Certiorari, leaving the prior ruling
to stand.
3.

HCHmoves dispute to WTO

Shortly after the 2 d Circuit affirmed the District Court's denial
of rights for HCH, the European Community and the United States
held discussions about the Havana Club trademark dispute.98 The
European Community got involved in this dispute at the request of
91 Ana Radelat, InternationalTrademark TreatyBecomes Enmeshed in Rum

War; Cuba Liquor Industry, CU1BA NEWS, No. 10, Vol. 8; Pg. 1 Oct. 1, 2000.
92
Havana Club Holding, S.A. v. Galleon, S.A, 62 F.Supp.2d 1085 (1999).
93

Id.

94 id.

95Id.
96 Havana
97

Club Holding, S.A. v. Galleon, S.A., 203 F.3d 116 (2d. Cir. 2000).
Havana Club Holding, S.A. v. Bacardi & Co., 531 U.S. 918 (2000).

98 World Trade Organization, 2000 News Item, at
www.wto.org/englislnewse/news00_e/dsbsep.e.htm (last visited Dec. 3,
2001).
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the French liquor company, Pemod Ricard, who holds a 50%
interest in HCH. 99 The EC has often been at odds with the United
States' policy towards Cuba, 100
and has repeatedly criticized the U.S's
trade embargo against Cuba.
10
These talks failed to reach a mutually satisfactory solution.
Subsequently, in June of 2000, the European Community filed a
complaint with the World Trade Organization (WTO) alleging that
§211 violates long standing international trademark agreements.10
More specifically, the EC cited the Trade-related aspects of
intellectual property rights (hereinafter referred to as TRIPS)
Agreement and the Paris Convention. 103 The TRIPS Agreement
and the Paris Convention are two multi-national treaties that seek
to establish minimum standards for protection of intellectual
property rights
where the foreign applicant would be treated as a
04
national.'
The WTO panel that heard the dispute sided with the United
States on all counts with one exception.' 0 5 It ruled that §211
violated Section 42 of the TRIPS Agreement which says,
"Members shall make available to the right holders civil judicial
procedures concerning the enforcement
of any intellectual property
10 6
right covered by this Agreement."'
The WTO panel rejected most of the EC's claims on the premise
that the TRIPS Agreement does not extend protection to trade

99 S. Rep. 107-46 (2001).
100 Sandburg, supranote 65.
101Id.

102 World

Trade Organization, United States - Section 211 omnibus

appropriationsAct of 1998- "Complaintby the European Communities," at
http://www.wto.org/englishltratopeldispue/distabe.htm#ds 176 (last visited
Dec.
3, 2001).
103 id.
104 Word Trade Organization, TRIPS Agreement,
http://www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/whatise/tife/agrm6_e.htm (last visited
Dec. 3, 2001).
105 World Trade Organization, Dispute Settlement panel report, at 96,
http://www.wto.orglenglish/tratope/dispue/176re.pdf (last visited Dec.3,

2001).

106 id.
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names. 107 The TRIPS Agreement expressly states that it covers:
copyright and related rights; trademarks, including service marks;
Geographical indications; Industrial designs; Patents; Layoutdesigns (topographies) of integrated circuits; and undisclosed
trade secrets.10 8 TRIPS does not expressly
information, including
10 9
mention trade names.
This WTO decision has been criticized as debilitating to the
TRIPS Agreement. 10 The decision could potentially hurt U.S.
companies that seek to enforce trade name protections abroad.1 '
For example, in the event that a U.S. company sought protection
for a trade name in another TRIPS Agreement country, it is likely
that the WTO would again rule that the TRIPS Agreement does
not protect trade names.11 The consequence of this decision could
prove damaging in the long run because U.S. companies actively
engage in international disputes to protect their intellectual
property rights worldwide.113
Not only could the decision have a debilitating effect, but it
could also cause retaliation. 14 For example, Cuban Dictator, Fidel
Castro, threatened to "strip protection" of approximately 400
American15 trademarks registered in Cuba over the Havana Club
dispute.'
107 id.

108 Word Trade Organization, TRIPS Agreement,

http://www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/whatise/tif e/agrm6_e.htm.
109 Id.
110 WTO Decision A Blow to IntellectualPropertyRules, National Journal's
Technology Daily, August 6, 2001 PM Edition (citing statement by Mark Orr,
Vice President for North American affairs for Pemod Ricard, "while helpful to
the U.S. in this particular case, has probably had a debilitating effect on the
TRIPS Agreement.").
See, Misha Gregory Macaw, The New Rum War: HavanaClub as a Threat to
111
the U.S. Interest In InternationalTrademarkHarmonization,18 B.U. Int'l L.J.
291, 294 (Fall, 2000).
112Id.
113 WTO DecisionA Blow To IntellectualPropertyRules, NATIONAL JOURNAL'S
PM Edition, August 6, 2001.
Ana Radelat, InternationalTtrademark Treaty Becomes Enmeshed in Rum

DAILY,
TECHNOLOGY
114

War, CUBA NEws, October 1, 2000.
115 Id.
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Further complicating this situation, on October 30, 2001, the
Supreme Court in Spain took away Bacardi's import monopoly of
its own brand.1 16 This decision opens the doors for other countries
that might want to purchase low-priced Bacardi rum in third
countries, and import them into Spain. 117 "The ruling could result
in a reduction in Bacardi's 50 per cent market share in Spain and
have a positive effect on other companies, including main rival
Pemod Ricard, importer of Havana Club."'1 18 There is no evidence
that this court ruling was in direct retaliation for Bacardi's victory
in front of the WTO, but one has to wonder about the timing of
this decision.
On October 4th, 2001, the European Union filed an appeal of
the ruling claiming multiple errors of law in not finding
inconsistencies between Section 211 and the TRIPS. 119 At the
time of this writing there has been no ruling on the appeal. The
decision will no doubt have an impact on whether or not the U.S.
becomes a member to the Madrid Protocol in the near future.
III. PROPOSED U.S. LEGISLATION

A. Previous CongressionalLegislation
H.R. 741 and S.407 were introduced concurrently in the House
and Senate on February 27, 2001.1 2 0 H.R. 741, whose short title is
the "Madrid Protocol Implementation Act," was introduced by
Rep. Howard Coble, who serves as the Chairman of the House
Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet, and
116

El TribunalSupremo Prohibea BacardiImportarsu marca en regimen de

Monopolio [Spanish High Court Prohibits Bacardi's Monopoly on Import of
own brand], El Pais (abstract), October 20, 2001.
117 id.

1181d.
1 19Notification of an Appeal by the European Communities of § 211 Omnibus
Appropriations Act of 1998, October 4, 2001, availableat
http://docsonline.wto.org/gen-search.asp - search for "WT/DS 176/5" (last
visited
Dec. 3, 2001).
120

H.R.741, 107th Cong. (2001) and S.407, 107th Cong. (2001).
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Intellectual Property. 121 Coble also introduced similar legislation
in the past two sessions of Congress, once in 1997 and then again
in 1999.122 Earlier versions of this legislation had also been
introduced by then-Representative Carlos Moorhead in 1995, and
by then-Representative William Huges in 1993 and 1992.123
S. 407, also known as the "Madrid Protocol Implementation
Act," was introduced by both Senator Orrin Hatch and Senator
Patrick Leahy.12 4 Senator Leahy introduced similar versions of
this legislation in 1998 and 1999.125 A version was also
introduced in 1993 by then Senator DeConcini, as S.977.126
One could compare the plight of the Madrid Protocol
Implementation Act with the plight of actress Susan Lucci to win a
Daytime Emmy Award for Outstanding Lead Actress in a Drama
Series. Year after year since 1978 (with the exception of 1979,
1980, and 1994), Susan Lucci was nominated to win the Daytime
Emmy for Outstanding Lead Actress, but never actually won the
award until 1999.127 Just like Lucci, the Madrid Protocol has been
introduced in every Congress since 1992, but has yet to pass,
despite the absence of political opposition.
1. 102nd Congress
In 1992, Representative Hughes introduced H.R. 6211, an Act to
Implement the Protocol Relating to the Madrid Agreement
Concerning the International Registration of Marks on October 8,
1992.128 The bill was referred to the House Committee on
Judiciary on the same day, then referred to the Subcommittee on
121Website

of Representative Howard Coble, at http://www.house.gov/coble/

visited Dec. 3, 2001).
(last
22
' H.R. 567, 105t Cong. (1997) and H.R. 769, 106th (1999).
123
H.R 6211, 102nd Cong. (1992).
124 S. 407, 107th Cong. (2001).
125 Press Statement for Senator Patrick

Leahy, at www.senate.gov/-leahy (last
visited Dec. 3, 2001).
126 S. 977, 103rd Cong. (1993).
127 Susan Lucci Biography of awards, at

http://us.imdb.com/Pawards?Lucci,+Susan (last visited Dec. 3, 2001).
1

H.R. 6211, 102nd Cong. (1992).

Published by Digital Commons@DePaul, 2016

17

DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 11, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 9

542

DEPAUL J ART. & ENT. LAW

[Vol. xi:525

129
Intellectual Property and Judicial Administration the next day.
The Subcommittee did not130hold any hearings, and it subsequently
died in the Subcommittee.

2. 103rd Congress
A bill to implement the Madrid Protocol was -first introduced in
the Senate during the 103rd Congress. 131 Senator Dennis
DeConcini introduced S. 977 on May 18th, 1993.132 The bill was
referred to the Judiciary Committee on that same day where it was
and
referred to the Subcommittee on Patents, Copyrights
1 33
Trademarks on the 2 4 th of June, where it eventually died.
Meanwhile, in the House, Representative William Hughes
introduced H.R. 2129 on May 17 h, a day earlier than it was
introduced in the Senate. 134 The bill was referred to the
Property
and
Judicial
on
Intellectual
Subcommittee
13
5
Administration.
Hearings were held shortly afterward in the
Subcommittee. 1 36 It passed the full committee, and then passed
the full House by a vote of 387-3 on October 3rd. 137 This marked
the first time a bill to implement the Madrid Protocol had passed
138
the House of Representatives by an overwhelming majority.
The bill was later received by the Senate on October 4 th, 1994, and
on Judiciary four days later,
was then referred to the Committee
139
where no other action was taken.
In May of 1995, the United States announced that it would not
join the Madrid Protocol because of the voting rights dispute with

129 id.
130 Id.

131S.

977, 103rd Cong. (1993).

132 rd.
133 id.
134 Id.
135 id.

136 S. 977,
137.[d.

103rd Cong. (1993).

138 id.
13 9 Id.
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the European Union. 140 The U.S. opposition was over concern that
this extra vote would tilt against the U.S. 14 1 However, the United
States continued to work142with the European Union in order to
resolve the disagreement.
3. 1 04 th Congress
In light of the position taken by the U.S. concerning the voting
rights issue, the 104 th Congress seemed less friendly to
implementing the Protocol. 143 The Senate failed to introduce a bill
to implement the Protocol. While in the House, Representative
Carlos Moorhead introduced H.R. 1270 on March 21, 1995, prior
to the U.S.'s announcement. 144 The bill was referred to the
Subcommittee on Courts and Intellectual Property, where the
Subcommittee held hearings in July. 145 The bill was then
forwarded to the full1 46Committee on Judiciary where it was left as
unfinished business.
4.

0 5 th

Congress

The 10 5 th Congress saw the re-emergence of the Madrid
Protocol Implementation Act in the Senate. This time, Senator
Patrick Leahy, ranking Democrat on the Senate Judiciary
Committee, introduced the bill, S. 2191.'47 The bill was referred
to the Committee on Judiciary on the same day it was149introduced,
h, 1998. 14 There was no further action taken.
June
In 18
the House, Representative Howard Coble introduced H.R.

140 Palik, supra note

62.

141 1-d.

142id.

' 43 H.R. 1270, 104"' Cong. (1995).
144 Id.
145 d.
146 id.

147 S. 2191, 105th Cong. (1998).
148 Id.
149

1d.
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567 on February 4, 1997.150 The bill was again referred to the
House Committee on the Judiciary, where it was referred to the
Subcommittee on Courts and Intellectual Property. 151 This
Subcommittee held hearings for the third time on May 22, 1997.152
The bill was then passed by the Subcommittee, full committee, and
for the second time, by the full House on May 5, 1998.15' The bill
to the
was received in the Senate on May 6 th, 1998, and 1referred
54
taken.
was
action
no
where
Committee on Judiciary,
t Congress
5. 106"
,
Senator Patrick Leahy introduced S. 671 on March 1 9 th 1999.155
The bill was referred to the Committee on Judiciary, where for the
first time it passed the Senate Judiciary Committee. 156 The bill
was then referred to the Senate Foreign relations Committee where
the Committee Chairman, Senator Jesse Helms, held it up over the
Havana Club trademark dispute.' 57 In addition, Senator Helms
also held up the Treaty Ratification, which President Clinton
forwarded to the Senate after the voting rights issue was resolved
with the EU.'58
In the House, Representative Howard Coble introduced H.R.
769 on February 23, 1999.159 This time, the Subcommittee
skipped the hearings, given that they had already held hearings on
the subject three times prior. 16 ° The bill passedth the full
1999.161
Committee, then it passed the full House on April 13 ,
The third time did not prove to be the charm, as for the third time,

150

H.R. 567, 105th Cong. (1997).

151 Id.
152

Id.

53

Id.

1

154 Id.
155 S. 671, 106th Cong. (1999).
156 Id.
157 Id.

158 Id.
"9
H.R. 769, 106th Cong. (1999).
60
1

Id.

161 Id.
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the bill was received by
the Senate and died without any sign of
1 62
Senate.
the
progress in
With the voting rights issue resolved, those who were watching
this issue closely expected that the bill would pass during the
106th Congress. 163 In a two part series on the Madrid Protocol,
trademark attorney John Welch, writes, "It appears that, before the
end of the year 2001, the United States will accede to the Madrid
Protocol.' ' 164 However, the Senate Foreign relations committee
rejected consideration
of the bill as a result of the Havana Club
165
dispute.
trademark
6. 1 0 7th Congress
Both the House and Senate have introduced versions of the
Madrid Protocol Implementation Act. 166 H.R. 741 passed the full
House on March 14, 2001.167 S. 407 unanimously passed the
Judiciary Committee on July 19, 2001 with an amendment stating
re-emphasizing that the Madrid Implementation Act does not make
any substantive changes to U.S. trademark law.168 The bill does
not, in fact, make substantive changes to the Lanham Act, the
amendment was added only to clear up confusion
and to make it
169
clearly acceptable to many of the Senators.
The Madrid Protocol Treaty recently passed the Senate Foreign
Relations committee by a voice vote on November 15, 2001. 170
This is a major milestone for the Treaty, as the Treaty has never
162 id.
163 International Trademark Association, The Madrid System for the
International Registration of Marks, Position Papers and Reports, at
http://www.inta.org/downloads/tapmadridsys2000.pdf (last visited Dec. 3,
2001). See also Welch, supra,note 10.
164 Welch, supra note 10.
165id.
166

167

id.
H.R.741, 107th Cong. (2001).

168 id.

169
170

S.Rep. No. 107-46, at 4 (2001).
S.Rep. 107-1, 107'h Cong. (2001), at http://www.gao.gov (last visited Dec. 3,

2001).
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made it out of this committee.
The 107th Congress saw a switch in leadership when the
Republican Senator from Vermont, Jim Jeffords, defected from the
party to become an Independent. 17 1 This had the effect of
changing the balance of power in the Senate from an even17250-50
Republican-led Senate to a 50-49-1 Democratic-led Senate.
Because of this shift in power, Senator Leahy, the bill's main
sponsor, became the Chairman of the Senate Judiciary
Committee. 173 Overall, this did not make a big difference, because
Orrin Hatch, who had been the Senate Judiciary Committee
Chairman under the Republican-led Senate had joined on as a cosponsor to this legislation in the 107 th Congress. 174 Hatch's
support had been seen as key to advancing the legislation under the
is no
Republican-led Senate, but after the shift, Hatch's support
175
benefit.
additional
an
is
longer pivotal, but nonetheless,
The most significant effect of the shift was the fact that Senator
Helms lost his Chairmanship to Democratic Senator Joseph
Bidden. 176 Because he lost his Chairmanship, Senator Helms no
177
longer has direct control over the Foreign Relations Schedule.
Further, Senator Bidden supports the Protocol, and has said he
would give the treaty priority because it has already had its
required hearing. 178 Therefore, the power switch will most likely
be felt with the leadership and direction in the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee. Yet, it still is left to be seen whether the
politically powerful Senator Helms will adversely influence
171 Website of Senator Jim Jeffords, at

http://vww.senate.gov/-jeffords/524statement.html (last visited Dec. 3, 2001).
172 Id.
173 Website of Senator Patrick Leahy, at, http://www.senate.gov/-eahy/ (last
visited Dec. 3, 2001).
'74 S. 407, 107th Cong. (2000).
175 William New, Key Lawmakers Move to Implement Trademark Treaty,
NATIONAL JOURNAL'S TECHNOLOGY DAILY, PM Edition, March 5, 2001.
176 Website of Senator Joseph Biden, at http://vwwv.senate.gov/-biden/ (last
visited
Dec. 3, 2001).
177 Website of Senate Foreign Relations Committee, at http://foreign.senate.gov/
(last visited Dec. 3, 2001).
178 IntellectualProperty:Senate Fate of a TrademarkTreaty Uncertain
[hereinafter FATE], NATIONAL JOURNAL'S TECHNOLOGY DAILY, June 29, 2001.
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consideration of the implementation legislation or consideration of
the Treaty. The entire Senate will soon consider the Treaty where
it requires a two-thirds majority for ratification.
B. MadridProtocolImplementation Act
Because both the House and Senate versions of these bills are
substantively identical, 179 they will be discussed as one. The
stated purpose of the Madrid Protocol Implementation Act is, "to
amend the Trademark Act of 1946 to provide for the registration
and protection of trademarks used in commerce, in order to carry
out provisions of certain international conventions, and for other
purposes."' 180 The bill makes no substantive change to the Lanham
Act, but rather sets up new procedures for trademark applicants
who will eventually want to obtain an international trademark
registration. 181 The bills amend the Lanham Act by adding
sections 60-74.182 Section 60 defines the key terms. 183 Section 61
addresses who is eligible for obtaining an International
Registration based on a U.S. application. 184 "The owner of a basic
registration pending before the USPTO or the owner of a
registration granted by the USPTO who is a national of the U.S, is
domiciled in the U.S., or has a real and effective industrial or
commercial establishment in the U.S."'185
Section 62 explains that the international application will be
examined to certify that the information corresponds to the basic
application. 186 It also states that the application will be forwarded
179 S. Rep. 107-46 107th, at (2001).

S.407, 107th Cong. (2001), Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate, at
2, at http://thomas.loc.gov, ("H.R. 741 is very similar to S. 407, except that
H.R. 741 would take effect as soon as the Madrid Protocol is ratified by the
Senate").
181
Press Statement for Senator Patrick Leahy, at www.senate.gov/.-eahy (last
visited
Dec. 3, 2001).
182
H.R. 741, 107th Cong. (2001) and S. 407, 107th Cong. (2001).
180

lId.

184 I-d.

185 Id.
186 id.
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to the International Bureau upon certification. 187 Section 63 is the
"Central Attack" provision, which states that the USPTO will
notify the International Bureau whenever the basic application has
been restricted, abandoned or canceled within the first five
years. 188 Section 64 states that the extension of protection should
be filed with either the International bureau or the USPTO, as long
as the correct fees accompany the request.' 8 9 Section 65 states that
the U.S. will extend protection to marks "to the extent necessary to
give effect to any provision of the Madrid Protocol."' 190 In
addition, it states that if the office of origin of the application is the
U.S., then 91an extension of protection for these marks is not
necessary.

Section 66 sets up the requirement that international applications
to the U.S. must be accompanied by a declaration of a "bona fide
intention to use the mark in commerce." 192 Section 67 details the
provisions for the right of priority dates for the international
applications. 93 Section 68 outlines the examination and opposition
process. 194 It states that the international applications for
extension of protection shall be examined as applications for
registration on the Principal Register. 195 It also states that if the
upon such examination the mark appears to be entitled to
protection it will then be published on in the USPTO Official
Gazette. 196 If the mark is not opposed, then the extension of
protection will be granted. 197 If the mark is opposed, then the
applicant will be notified that the extension of protection has been
denied. 198 The USPTO must notify the international bureau of its
117

H.R. 741, 107th Cong. (2001) and S. 407, 107th Cong. (2001)..

189

1d.

188 Id.

190 Id.

191H.R.

192

id.

741, 107th Cong. (2001) and S. 407, 107th Cong. (2001).

193 Id.
194 Id.
195.Id.

96 H.R. 741, 107th Cong. (2001) and S. 407, 107th Cong. (2001)..

197

19 8

id.
id.
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decision within 18 months or else the USPTO will lose the right to
refuse the extension of protection. 199 This section also requires
international applicants to designate an agent for service of process
who is a resident in the United States.200 Section 69 details the
effects of the extension of protection.20 ' It states that the extension
of protection grants the international applicant the same
legitimacy, and "rights and remedies" as a registration on the
Principal Register.20 2
Section 70 discusses the extent to which the extension of
protection in the U.S. shall be dependent upon the international
application.20 3 It states that if the International Bureau notifies the
USPTO that there has been abandonment or cancellation of certain
goods or services from a registration, then the U.S. will also cancel
the extension of protection with respect to those goods and
services.20 4 It also states that the U.S will cancel the extension of
protection if the International Bureau fails to renew the
application.205 Subsection C of Section 70 allows for
"Transformation," which is the remedy when an international
application has been cancelled by the International Bureau or
home country.2 0 6 Transformation allows the cancelled applicant to
subsequently file directly with the U.S., while keeping the date of
the original international application, as long as it files with the
USPTO within 3 months of cancellation.2 0 7 This is the remedy
that the Protocol allows for "Centrally attacked" marks.20 8
Section 71 sets out the requirements for filing affidavits for use,
and fees.20 9 The Director of the USPTO prescribes the fees.210
199 Yd.
200 id.

20oH.R.

741, 107th Cong. (2001) and S. 407, 107th Cong. (2001)..

202.Id.

203 1-d.
204 id.
205 id.

20
2 07

H.R. 741, 107th Cong. (2001) and S.407, 107th Cong. (2001)..
Id

208 id.
209

id.

210 id.
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Section 72 sets out the provisions for assignment of an extension
of protection.2 1 1 It states that an extension of protection can be
assigned only to persons who are affiliated with a contracting party
to the Madrid Protocol. 212 Section 73 states that the extension of
protection begins on the date when the USPTO issues the
certificate of the extension of protection. 213 Section 74 sets out that
the extension of protection is fully valid when the extension of
protection and existing registrations are owned by the same person
and contain the same goods and services to be covered, and when
the certificate is issued after the date of the existing registration.214
The bill concludes by stating, "This Act and the amendments made
by this Act shall take effect on the date on which the Madrid
Protocol enters into force with respect the United States."
C. CurrentBill Status
It is an exciting time right now for the international Trademark
community. On November 15, 2001, the Senate Foreign Relations
215
Committee passed the Madrid Protocol Treaty by a voice vote.
This is exactly where the Treaty and Implementation legislation
were held up last Congress.216 S. 407 has still not passed the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee. 217 It appears that the Senate
Floor might pass the Treaty, and S. 407 (if it makes it out of the
Foreign Relations Committee), before year's end. 1 8 The House
version, H.R. 741, already passed the full House by voice vote on

2 11

2 12

id.
id.

213 Id.
214 Id.
215 S. E. REP. 107-1, 107 ' Cong. (2001), at http://www.gao.gov (last visited

Dec. 3, 2001).t
216 S. 671 106 f Cong. (1999).
217
S. 407 107' h Cong. (2001).
218 Telephone Interview with Lynne Weil, Senate Foreign Relations staff
member for the majority (November 21, 2001) (given the fact that the
Democrats have a 49-49-1 majority in the Senate and the only opposition to the
Protocol is a Republican, Jesse Helms).
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March 14, 2001.219

IV.

ANALYSIS

The angst-ridden history of this bill begs the question, "How
could an Intellectual Property bill, void of any political opposition,
be rejected by the Congress year after year?" This question is
pointedly significant in light of the overwhelming support this bill
has from the U.S. business community. 220 According to many,
"This should have been a no-brainer for even the previous
Congress. 22 1 Once the State Department ironed out the voting
rights issue with the European Union, and given the
Administration's endorsement of the treaty, most people in the
Community, including INTA, expected
International Trademark
222
the bill to finally pass.
It seems this year the legislation may also fall through the
cracks, despite the support of Senator Joseph Bidden, who now
chairs the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. Priority in the
U.S. Congress has been given to legislation concerning terrorism
and anti-terrorism measures due to the terrorist attacks of Sept.
11th. Joining the rest of the world in registering trademarks, while
once seemed important, now pails in comparison to making sure
that our public and armed forces are prepared for preventing
another terrorist attack. What's more, the anthrax scares in the
Congress have kept the Congress working at a slower pace than
their already turtle-like speed.

219

H.R. 741, 107th Cong. (2001).

220 International Trademark Association, The Madrid System for the
International Registration of Marks, Position Papers and Reports, at
http://www.inta.org/downloads/tapmadridsys2000.pdf (last visited Dec. 3,

2001).
221 James Stroder, Of Rum and Trademarks, WORLD TRADE, January 1, 2001.
222 International Trademark Association, The Madrid System for the
International Registration of Marks, Position Papers and Reports, at
http://www.inta.org/downloads/tapmadridsys2000.pdf (last visited Dec. 3,
2001).

Published by Digital Commons@DePaul, 2016

27

DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 11, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 9

552

DEPAUL J ART. & ENT. LAW

[Vol. xi:525

A. Why Join?
Simplicity, increased efficiency and cost savings are the key
selling points for the Madrid Protocol. In their Executive
Summary of the Madrid Protocol, INTA highlights the simplicity
of the Protocol, "ONE application, in ONE place with ONE set of
documents in ONE language with ONE fee in ONE currency
resulting in ONE registration with ONE number and ONE renewal
date covering more than ONE country."223
All renewals,
amendments to applications, and changes of ownership are
handled by one office, relieving business of the stress of tracking
down several applications in the countries they seek to file.224
The cost savings afforded by the Protocol are also an attractive
feature. In 1999, the White House released a press statement about
the cost savings involved in registering a mark in 10 different
countries. 225
The statement estimated that it would cost
approximately $14,000 to register in each country individually,
whereas it would cost
only $4,700 for the same 10 registrations by
226
using the Protocol.
There are also other benefits of the U.S. joining the Protocol.
By joining the Protocol, U.S. companies will be allowed an easy
way to register their trademarks in simultaneously in the U.S. and
other countries. 22 7 The simultaneous registration will prevent
trademark "piracy," where individuals in foreign countries register
a U.S. company's trademark, then as for a "ransom" in order to
surrender the company's trademark.22 8 In addition, U.S. accession,
will encourage other countries to join so their companies could
223 International Trademark Association, Executive Summary on the Madrid
Protocol, at 8, at http://www.inta.org/policy/position.shtml (last visited Dec. 3,
2001).
224

id.

See, Keith W. Medansky, United States May Join Ranks ofMadridProtocol,
IntellectualProperty,April 30, 2001, (quoting WH press statement).
22

226 Id.

227 International Trademark Association, Executive Summary on the Madrid

Protocol, at 8, at http://www.inta.org/policy/position.shtrml (last visited Dec. 3,
2001).
228

id.
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229
more easily gain access to U.S. markets.

B.

Goodfor Business?

If the U.S. joins the Protocol, the biggest winners would be U.S.
businesses that seek new markets for their products, especially the
smaller companies who would otherwise not be able to afford the
These
expense of registration in every individual country.
trademark owners could potentially see big savings and increased
efficiency.2 30 Senator Orrin Hatch, former Senate Judiciary
Committee Chairman and sponsor of S. 407 recognized the
importance of implementing the Protocol for U.S. businesses, "For
many businesses, a company's trademark is its most valuable asset
as global trading and multinational businesses grow, worldwide
protection is becoming extremely important and desirable... the
Madrid Protocol and S. 407 present a win-win package for
American trademark owners, one that is important to all American
businesses engaged in the international marketplace." 23 ' Even, the
current Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman, Democratic
Senator Patrick Leahy has praised the bill as being helpful to U.S.
businesses, "The Protocol would help American businesses, and
especially small and medium-sized companies, protect their
trademarks as they expand into international markets." 232 It is
certain that U.S. business believe they stand to benefit from U.S.
implementation of the Protocol. For this reason, it is unusual that
229 FATE, supra note 178.
International Trademark Association, Executive Summary on the Madrid
Protocol, at 8, at http://www.inta.org/policy/position.shtnl (last visited Dec. 3,
2001).
231 Committee Statement of Senator Orrin Hatch before the Senate Judiciary
Committee executive business meeting on the markup of S. 407- The Madrid
Protocol Implementation Act, Thursday, July 19, 2001, at
230

http://hatch.senate.gov/pressapp/record.cfin?id=177461 (last visited Dec. 3,
2001).
232 Statement of Senator Patrick Leahy before the Senate Judiciary Committee
executive business meeting on the markup of S. 407- The Madrid Protocol
Implementation Act, Thursday, July 19, 2001, at
9
http://www.senate.gov/leahy/press/200l07/01071 .html (last visited Dec. 3,
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this legislation has been kicked around in the Congress for 10
years without ever getting close to passage by both houses of
Congress. U.S. businesses are normally accustomed to lobbying
Congress to pass legislation favorable to their interests.
Some large U.S. companies having significant operations in
foreign countries that are members of the Madrid Protocol, have
the opportunity to register their trademarks internationally via the
233
Protocol based on their residence in the Protocol country.
have chosen not to do this because of legal and tax
However, most
23 4
implications.
Despite all the positive attention the Protocol has received, it is
not without it's critics.235 Critics believe that the cost savings that
are not as great as they seem. 236 The increase in expected expense
will likely hurt the smaller U.S. businesses.237 In addition, because
the Madrid Protocol fees are denominated in Swiss Currency, the
trademark holders
are also at the mercy of the fluctuating
23 8
exchange rate.
In all likelihood, accession into the Protocol will be good for
U.S. businesses, especially in the long run. In the short run, the
businesses will have to become acquainted with how the system
works and make decisions on whether to use the Protocol or not.
C. Badfor Lawyers ?
While the accession to the Protocol seems to favor U.S. business
interests, U.S. trademark lawyers expect to loose business.23 9
Trademark lawyers have expressed concern that the Protocol will
cut down on their work on behalf of foreign companies applying
for registration from the USPTO. 240 For example, if ABC
233 COOKSON, supranote 11, 169.

234 id.

22365 WELCH, supranote 10, at 30.
id.
237 See Carlo Cotrone, The UnitedStates and the MadridProtocol:A Time to
Decline, 4 Time to Accede, 4 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REv. 75-105, 2000.
238 WELCH, supra note 10, at 30.
239 Sandburg, supra note 65.
240 id.
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Company of Germany wanted to register their "ABC" trademark,
they would normally hire a U.S. attorney to file and follow the
application through the registration process. However, under the
Protocol, ABC Company would not need to hire local counsel in
the U.S., but rather, would file an extension of protection to the
U.S. based on their German application or registration. If no one
opposes their registration, they would have no need for a U.S.
attorney at any stage of the registration process, effectively cutting
out the middleman. However, this fear is highly exaggerated since
2 41
the USPTO has a high rate of refusal for first time applications.
In the likely event that Protocol applications are opposed, or
refused registration, the services of U.S. trademark attorneys will
be required to appeal the decision and advance the application
2
This is the scenario that trademark
along towards registration.22443
on.
banking
be
will
lawyers
John L. Welch, suggests in his article, Madrid Bound: The
244
United States Approaches Ratification of the MadridProtocol,
that U.S. trademark attorneys will likely raise the rates for picking
up applications at the opposition stage, in order to recover the
revenue they'll loose for being bypassed at the initial application
stage.2 4 In addition, he adds that European lawyers will be at a
greater disadvantage because the registration process in many
European countries is not as thorough, and will likely not refuse as
many applications, eliminating the need for a European attorney to
pick up the application at that point.246
Ironically, INTA, in their Executive Summary for the Madrid
System, states that accession to the Protocol will cause an
increased workload for local attorneys. 247 INTA further attempts
to reassure lawyers by explaining that lawyers in existing Protocol
241

Welch, supranote 10.

242 id.
243
Id.
244 id.
245 id.

Welch, supranote 10.
International Trademark Association, Executive Summary on the Madrid
Protocol, at 8, at http://www.inta.org/policy/position.shtml (last visited Dec. 3,
2001).
246

247
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countries have not seen their workload cut as a result ofjoining the
Protocol, but instead have seen a change in the character of their
248
work.
It is likely that if and when the U.S. joins the Protocol, lawyers,
especially U.S. lawyers, will see an increase in work due to an
initial influx of applications. Foreign lawyers will also see an
increase due to all the foreign
corporations that seek protection for
249
U.S.
the
in
their trademarks
U.S. lawyers are also concerned that the increase in filings
coupled with the eighteen-month deadline for examination of
Protocol applications will cause the USPTO to "water down" their
stringent registration process. 250 Moreover, there is concern that
the USPTO will conform their standards for registration in
accordance with some
countries whose registration process is seen
25 1
stamp."
"rubber
a
as
The USPTO has anticipated a rise in applications, and has asked
for $500,000 to update their computer system to be able to deal
with the flood of applications they're expecting. 252 Therefore,
these measures of advanced planning, along with the speculative
nature of anticipating a flood of applications makes it highly
questionable whether the USPTO will relax their registration
standards. It is unlikely that they will resort to having to relax
their standards. However, it is likely that if the USPTO finds that
they can not deal with increasing applications with the existing
staff, they may resort to hiring new attorneys and subsequently,
raising the rates for applications in order to cover this expense.
In the very unlikely event that the USPTO does lower their
registration standards, the opposition stage will weed out many. of
the foreign applications that will be seeking registration. Lawyers
248 id.

249

id.

250 Sandburg,

supra note 65.
Id.(quoting trademark lawyer, Douglas Hendricks, [Registration in many
countries] "is almost a rubber stamp... There is some thought we might lower
our standards to match theirs and become a registration mill instead of a vetting
agency").
22
1 S.Rep. 107-46 (2001).
251
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for trademark owners frequently police the publication of
trademarks for opposition and will file oppositions, which will
then be considered by the USPTO examining attorney. If the
standards are lowered so low as to allow for the registration of
foreign trademarks with confusingly similar U.S. counterparts,
U.S. lawyers will have more to litigate. Therefore creating even
more work for them, and more headaches for trademark owners.
Therefore, the scenario that INTA has posed where U.S.
trademark lawyers will not see a reduction in work, but rather, a
modification in the type of work that they currently spend time
with. It is not likely that trademark owners, foreign or domestic
will be able to entirely cut out the middleman.
Nevertheless, the U.S. should join the Protocol because it is a
good way to simplify international registration. The Protocol
could be modified, if problems arise, and it not uncommon for
lawyers to suggest change when mechanisms do not function as
they are supposed to.
D. Sovereignty
Maintaining sovereignty over the nation's trademark laws are of
utmost importance to the U.S., as it would be for many other
countries. 253 In fact, in Senator Leahy's statement concerning the
Protocol, he twice emphasized that the Protocol makes no
substantive change to U.S. trademark laws. 254 Countries are not
going to be willing to make changes to their own laws to protect
foreign trademarks.
Instead, the Madrid Protocol works by allowing all the countries
to maintain their own laws in tact.255 The Protocol will even
tolerate countries adding the requirements they would normally

Press Statement for Senator Patrick Leahy, at www.senate.gov/-leahy (last
visited Dec. 3, 2001).
254 id.
255 Protocol Relating to the Madrid Agreement Concerning the International
Registration of Marks, April 1, 1996 at
http://www.wipo.int/madrid/en/index.html (last visited Dec. 3, 2001).
2s3
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ask of entities who apply to the USPTO individually. 256 For
example, section 71(a)(A)(b), requires all international applicants
to hand in an affidavit of use which the USPTO requires before
registration. 257 This is a specific U.S. requirement that Protocol
enforcement mechanism. 258 It
allows, because the Protocol has2no
59
is only a registration mechanism.
The uniformity of laws could cause many problems in the
future. What is the extent to which the Protocol is willing to allow
nation-specific requirements? A unified system of protection
would be most helpful to trademark owners. This would make it
easier for them to know the extent of their rights in foreign
countries. An agreement of this type would incorporate a
registration system, like the Madrid Protocol, and an agreement
like the TRIPS Agreement where you would have a standard
minimum of protection and enforcement mechanism.
However, if history is any indicator, the chances of many
countries ratifying an agreement of this magnitude are slim. It has
taken the global community over a century to embrace the Madrid
System, and even today, many countries find problems with the
System. Is a problem of sovereignty? Should countries be willing
to give up a measure of sovereignty in order to have more
uniformity of rights and protections?
The Havana Club episode is a good example why the United
States would probably never be willing to give up sovereignty in
order to join an international system for registration of trademarks.
In 1999, then-Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman,
Jesse Helms pulled the Madrid Protocol implementation bill, and
the Treaty ratification from consideration because he was
concerned that accession into the Protocol would give Havana
on going trademark dispute
Club Holdings an advantage in 2the
60
over the Havana Club trade name.
Cuba has been a member of the Madrid Protocol since
256 1-d.
27

S. 407 107th Cong. (2001) and H.R. 741 107th Cong., § 71 (2001).

258 Id.

259 id.
260 See

supranote 56.
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December 26, 1995.261 If and when the United States joins the
Protocol, it would likely find itself in a situation where Cuba or a
Cuban entity files an extension of protection under the Protocol.
The USPTO would have to examine the application in order to
consider it for registration in compliance with the Protocol.
However, Article 5 of the Protocol requires that refusals to register
should only be based on grounds recognized by the Paris
Convention. 262 The Paris Convention offers only three acceptable
reasons for refusing trademark applications, if it conflicts with an
existing mark, if it lacks distinctiveness, and if it263"contrary to
morality or public order" or if it deceives the public.
The USPTO would not be able to cite §211 as a reason for
refusal of registration.264 However, in the case of Havana Club,
the PTO might be able to invoke section (B)(1) of Article 6 of the
261

World Intellectual Property Organization, (2001) Madrid Protocol, List of

Member Countries, at http://www.wipo.int/madrid/en/index.html (last visited
Dec. 3, 2001).
262 Protocol Relating to the Madrid Agreement Concerning the International
Registration of Marks, at 4. Article 5(1). "Any such refusal can be based only on
the grounds which would apply, under the Paris Convention for the Protection
of Industrial Property, in the case of a mark deposited direct with the Office
which notifies the refusal," at http://www.wipo.int/madrid/en/index.html_(last
visited Dec. 3, 2001).
262
Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Article 6 (B)(1-3)
"Trademarks covered by this Article may be neither denied registration nor
invalidated except in the following cases: 1. when they are of such a nature as to
infringe rights acquired by third parties in the country where protection is
claimed; 2. when they are devoid of any distinctive character, or consist
exclusively of signs or indications which may serve, in trade, to designate the
kind, quality, quantity, intended purpose, value, place of origin, of the goods, or
the time of production, or have become customary in the current language or in
the bona fide and established practices of the trade of the country where
protection is claimed; 3. when they are contrary to morality or public order and,
in particular, of such a nature as to deceive the public. It is understood that a
mark may not be considered contrary to public order for the sole reason that it
does not conform to a provision of the legislation on marks, except if such
provision itself relates to public order. This provision is subject, however, to the
application of Article 10(b)." http://www.wipo.int/treaties/ip/paris/index.html
(last
visited Dec. 3, 2001).
263 Td
, d.
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Paris Convention, which allows refusals for marks that are likely
to infinge existing marks. 265 This is, of course, contingent upon
the USPTO's prior recognition of Bacardi's ownership of the
Havana Club trademark in the U.S.
On the other hand, if there were no recognition of Bacardi's
prior ownership rights, the USPTO would have no basis for
refusal, and would be forced to register the mark, or refuse the
mark and risk violating the Protocol. 266 The U.S. would probably
not want to breach the Protocol and set a bad precedent in favor of
This could, again, set off
disregarding international law.
retaliation against U.S. marks worldwide. If the mark were
recognized, it would have the same effect and validity and the
same rights and remedies as a registration on the Principal
Register, which would allow the trademark owner, HCH, access to
2 67

our courts.

Allowing HCH rights to our courts would likely violate §211,
because HCH's assets were confiscated from the Arechebala
family by2 68 the Cuban government immediately after the
revolution.
This scenario would present an international dilemma for the
United States. Once which it will likely decide in favor of its own
interest in sovereignty over their own laws, thereby disrupting
international laws.
V. CONCLUSION
At the time of this writing, it is too early to tell whether the
Madrid Protocol Implementation Act will finally make it to the
President's desk before this session of Congress is over. In spite of
the news that the Treaty recently passed the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, there are still many steps required in the
legislative process before the Protocol could become law in the
U.S. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee must now pass the
26 5

id.

266 Id.
26 7
H.R. 741, (2001) and S. 407, 107th Cong. (2001).
268 See, supra note 65.
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Implementing legislation, and then the full Senate must pass both
the Treaty and the Implementation legislation. The Treaty will
then go to the President, whereby the legislation will be discussed
in a joint House-Senate Committee. The speed with which the
following steps are taken depends on many factors that can only be
controlled by the members of Congress. The bill still faces
opposition from Senator Jesse Helms, at least until the WTO
decides the appeal concerning the Havana Club trade name
dispute.269
If the WTO rules in favor of the U.S., it is more likely that the
implementation legislation will move forward. The WTO has not
made any ruling on the EC's appeal yet, and one can only
speculate what the panel will conclude. If, however, the WTO
decides in favor of the EC, the U.S. might "feel pressured to
comply by changing §211 because the U.S. has complained in the
past about EU non-compliance in other WTO cases, and because
to set a poor precedent on an intellectual
the U.S. would not want
'
property-related case ,,270
This would likely cause further delays
to the legislation.
In addition, the September 11th terrorist attack, and the recent
rash of Anthrax scares could prove to be the new obstacle for the
legislation. The attacks have already closed down the Congress a
few days, and have caused a new influx of legislation.271 Despite
the intention of moving the legislation forward, the Senate might
find itself too caught up with fighting terrorism that international
registration of trademarks might not seem as such a priority. It is
anyone's guess whether this legislation will pass this Congress.
However, the news of the Treaty passing the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee is definitely a good indicator that Senate
Foreign Relations Committee Chairman, Senator Joseph Biden, is
269

Interview with Thomas Brady, Senator Jesse's Foreign Relations staff
member (November 21, 2001) (Staff member stated that Senator Helms still
intends on posing opposition to the Madrid Protocol, at least until the Havana
Club dispute is resolved in the U.S.'s favor).
270
FATE,supra note 178.
271 See, Legislation Related to the Attack of September 11, 2001, at,
http://thomas.loc.gov.
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keeping true to his commitment to give the Protocol priority.272
Upon reaching the President's desk, the legislation and Treaty
will be greeted more hospitably, since President Bush has released
a statement in support of the Implementation Act. Therefore, U.S.
and foreign businesses seeking the "one-stop-shop" approach to
trademark registrations will have to wait and see what happens in
the next few months.
Maria Guerra

272 FATE,

supra note 178.
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